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Abstract—Wireless local area networks (WLANs) based on
IEEE 802.11 standards are becoming ubiquitous today and typi-
cally support multiple data rates. In such multi-rate WLANs, dis-
tributed medium access and rate adaptation are two key elements
to achieve efficient radio resource utilization, especially in non-
cooperative environments. In this paper, we present an analytical
study on the non-cooperative multi-rate WLANs composed of
selfish users jointly adjusting their data rate and contention
window size at the medium access level to maximize their own
throughput, irrespective of the impact of their selfish behaviors on
overall system performance. Specifically, we develop an adapted
Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy to guide the system to an efficient
equilibrium in non-cooperative environments. We model the inter-
actions among selfish users under the adapted TFT framework as
a non-cooperative joint medium access and rate adaptation game.
A systematic analysis is conducted on the structural properties
of the game to provide insights on the interaction between rate
adaptation and 802.11 medium access control in a competitive
setting. We show that the game has multiple equilibria, which,
after the equilibrium refinement process that we develop, reduce
to a unique efficient equilibrium. We further develop a distributed
algorithm to achieve this equilibrium and demonstrate that the
equilibrium achieves the performance very close to the system
optimum in a social perspective.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. General Context
Wireless local area networks (WLANs) based on IEEE
802.11 standards are becoming ubiquitous today and typically
support multiple data transmission rates, e.g., four in 802.11b,
eight in 802.11a/g and 20 in 802.11n. In such multi-rate
WLANs, distributed medium access and rate adaptation are
two key elements to achieve efficient radio resource utilization.
In this paper, we focus on the competitive scenario where
selfish users jointly adjust their data rate and contention window
(CW) size at the medium access level to maximize their
own throughput, irrespective of the impact of their selfish
behaviors on overall system performance. Our focus on the
non-cooperative scenario is motivated by the following two
observations:
Today, network adapters are highly programmable, making
a selfish user extremely easy to tamper wireless interface to
maximize its own benefit, especially in environments without
central administration such as public hot-spots or WLANs
operated by different enterprisers;
WLANs are by nature distributed environments lack of
coordination and sophisticated network feedback. In such envi-
ronments, non-cooperative selfish behaviors maximizing local
utilities are much more robust and scalable than any centralized
cooperative control, which is very expensive or even impossible
to implement.
B. Related Work
The existing literature on the non-cooperative medium access
and rate control in WLANs can be naturally categorized in the
following two domains:
Non-cooperative medium access: Recent studies [1], [2] have
studied some undesirable effects of the selfish behaviors at the
medium access level on the system performance, with the main
result being that such selfish behaviors, even of a small number
of users, can paralyze the entire network. Hence a number of
mechanisms, based on punishment schemes [1], [2], disutility
function [3] and Tit-For-Tat concept [4], have been proposed
to thwart the selfish behaviors and drive the network to an
efficient equilibrium. Another relevant research thrust [5], [6],
[7], consists of applying game theory to analyze and reverse-
engineer the 802.11 MAC protocol and providing insights on
designing more efficient wireless MAC protocols.
Non-cooperative rate adaptation: Since 802.11 standards do
not specify any rate adaptation algorithm, extensive research
efforts have been investigated in this field, resulting a number of
rate adaptation mechanisms, ranging from the seminal work on
automatic rate fallback (ARF) approach [8] to later developed
algorithms to improve and replace ARF, e.g., [9], [10], [11].
The key idea is to track channel quality based on packet
losses and adapt data rate accordingly. More recently in non-
cooperative setting, related works [12], [13], [14], [15] have
discussed some undesirable effects of the 802.11 MAC layer
distributed coordination function (DCF) on the overall network
performance when multiple competing nodes use different data
rates. Specifically, [12] demonstrates the so-called performance
anomaly in 802.11 WLANs such that when competing nodes
transmit at different data rates, the aggregate throughput is
dominated by the lowest transmission rate. Tan et al. [13]
investigate the time-based fairness, in which each node is given
an equal amount of channel time, and the throughput-based
fairness, in which each node achieves equal throughputs and
show via experiments that time-based fairness can improve
performance in multi-rate WLANs. Rate adaptation games
in WLANs without and with loss distinction are studied in
2[16]. Pricing mechanisms are proposed in [17] to increase the
efficiency of the equilibrium of the non-cooperative rate control
game.
C. Paper Overview and Contributions
Despite a rich body of existing work, the vast majority of
them addresses the non-cooperative behaviors at medium access
and rate adaptation levels separately. The following natural
but crucial questions arise: What is the situation if users can
jointly configure their medium access and rate level strategies
selfishly? How the two levels interact with each other? How
to orient the system towards a fair and efficient equilibrium in
this two-dimensional competitive scenario?
Motivated by the above observation, this paper provides
a systematic analysis on the non-cooperative joint medium
access and rate adaptation game in 802.11 WLANs under the
adapted Tit-For-Tat (TFT) framework, a natural strategy in
non-cooperative environments widely applied in many appli-
cations such as peer-to-peer networks [18]. We adapt the TFT
strategy at both medium access and rate adaptation level (the
authors of [4] study the TFT strategy only at medium access
level for homogeneous users where the rate adaptation is not
considered). The adapted TFT strategy does not require any
coordination or incentive mechanisms which may be expensive
or even impossible to implement in distributed environments
as 802.11 WLANs and inherently ensures user fairness at both
levels.
Aiming to provide in-depth understanding of the interaction
between rate adaptation and medium access in competitive
setting from an analytical perspective, we analyze the structural
properties of the formulated game. Specifically, we show that
the game has multiple equilibria, which, after the equilibrium
refinement process that we develop, reduce to a unique efficient
equilibrium. We further develop a distributed algorithm to
achieve this equilibrium and demonstrate that the equilibrium
achieves the performance very close to the system optimum in
a social perspective.
From a user-centric perspective, our work also provides
an analytical framework that can stabilize the network in a
distributed fashion around a system equilibrium with fairness
(or service differentiation) and high efficiency.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-rate 802.11 WLAN of a set N =
{1, · · · , n} of selfish (but not malicious) users, each of whom
tries to maximize his own utility (e.g., throughput) by conduct-
ing the following two-dimensional selfish strategies:
Medium access: Each user i selfishly modifies the distributed
random back-off medium access mechanism imposed by 802.11
DCF so as to maximize its utility. More specifically, we focus
on the modification of the key parameter in DCF, the contention
window (CW) size, denoted by Wi.
Rate adaptation: Each user i selfishly configures its data rate
Ri, given the channel condition and other parameters, so as to
maximize its utility. Note that IEEE 802.11 standards support
multiple transmission rates and leave users to implement their
rate adaptation algorithms, which essentially consists of seeking
a tradeoff between the transmission rate and the packet loss due
to channel errors.
III. MARKOV MODEL OF A MULTI-RATE 802.11 WLAN
WITH SELFISH USERS
A. The Markov Model
To model the users’ selfish behaviors and to capture their
impact on the network performance, we develop a Markov
model on the exponential back-off process by taking into
account the users’ selfish behaviors. Our model follows the
ideas of the seminal work of Bianchi [19], and is based on the
same assumptions:
• Traffic saturation: The network is saturated such that all
users have packets to transmit at any time1;
• Decoupling of collision probability: The collision proba-
bility is decoupled from the back-off stage;
Fig. 1: The Markov model of user i
The Markov model of user i selfishly operating on Wi and Ri
is depicted in Figure 1. Each state in the chain is denoted by a
couple (l, k) with l = 0, · · · ,m being the back-off stage and k
the back-off counter (k ≤ 2l− 1). The CW value doubles after
each consecutive collision until when the maximum back-off
stage m is achieved. State transitions happen at the beginning
of each virtual slot, as defined in [19]. Despite the similarity
between our model and the Bianchi’s model on standard 802.11
DCF, there are two key differences that make the sequential
analysis more challenging:
Heterogeneity: The selfishness at both medium access and
rate adaptation level leads to heterogeneous Markov models
among users. Hence the resulting stationary state solution is
heterogeneous among users, rather than being identical for all
users as in [19];
Impact of data rate: Different from [19], the stationary state
of the Markov model is jointly determined by the medium
access parameters and data rate. As shown later in the paper,
this cross-layer interdependence brings non-trivial difficulties in
1This assumption is justified in our context as the network is saturated when
selfish users try to maximize their share of bandwidth by depriving other users
of their share.
3the analysis of the system equilibrium and requires an original
study that cannot rely on any existing results.
Denote τi the transmission probability of node i in a random
slot and pi the conditioned collision probability of i (the
collision probability when i transmits a packet in a random
slot), recall the decoupling and saturation assumptions, we can
establish the state transition probabilities as follows:
P{l, k|l, k+ 1} = 1, 0 ≤ k ≤ 2lWi − 2, 0 ≤ l ≤ m,
P{0, k|l, 0} = 1− qi
Wi
, 0 ≤ k ≤Wi − 1, 0 ≤ l ≤ m,
P{l, k|l− 1, 0} = qi
2lWi
, 0 ≤ k ≤ 2lWi − 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ m,
P{m, k|m, 0} = qi
2mWi
, 0 ≤ k ≤ 2mWi − 1,
where P{s1, b1|s2, b2} denotes the transition probability from
state (s1, b1) to (s2, b2), qi denotes the probability a packet
arrives at destination without error, detailed as follows
qi = 1− (1− pi)[1 − ei(Ri)], (1)
where ei(Ri) is the packet error rate such that a packet is
lost due to channel error when user i operates on data rate
Ri. The four formulas describe the transition probabilities
corresponding to the following scenarios under DCF:
• i decrements its CW at the beginning of each slot;
• Once i finish a successful transmission, the next packet’s
back-off timer is selected uniformly from the range
[0,Wi − 1], corresponding to the first back-off stage;
• In case of a transmission failure, the back-off stage is
incremented and the back-off timer is selected uniformly
from the range [0, 2lWi − 1];
• Once in stage m, the back-off stage is no more incre-
mented.
B. Analysis of Stationary State Solution
To derive the stationary state of i, let bl,k ,
limt→∞ P{s(t) = l, b(t) = k} denote the stationary proba-
bility distribution, we can derive the following equations to
express bl,k by b0,0:
bl,0 = qib0,0, 0 ≤ l ≤ m− 1,
bm,0 =
qi
1− qi b0,0,
bl,k =
2lWi − k
2lWi
bl,0, 1 ≤ k ≤ 2lWi − 1, 0 ≤ l ≤ m.
Apply
∑m
l=0
∑2lWi−1
k=0 bl,k = 1, we can solve b0,0 as
b0,0 =
2(1− 2qi)(1− qi)
(1− 2qi)(Wi + 1) + qiWi(1− (2qi)m) .
Thus, the probability τi that user i transmits in a random slot
can be expressed as
τi =
m∑
l=0
bl,0 =
2
Wi + 1 + qiWi
∑m−1
l=0 (2q)
l
. (2)
On the other hand, we have
pi = 1−
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
(1− τj). (3)
Combine (1), (2) and (3), we obtain 3n equations with 3n
unknowns. In Theorem 1 that follows, we prove that given
any data rate profile (Ri)i∈N , the system characterized by
the 3n equations admits a unique solution under the mild
condition Wi > 3, ∀i ∈ N . These equations can then be solved
numerically.
Before presenting Theorem 1, we define the following func-
tion:
Γi(x) ,
2
Wi + 1 + xWi
∑m−1
l=0 (2x)
l
. (4)
The following properties hold straightforwardly:
• τi = Γi(qi);
• From (1), (2) and (3), it holds that
(1− qi)(1− Γi(qi))
1− ei(Ri) =
∏
j∈N
(1− τj); (5)
• By checking the derivative, it can be shown that (1−x)[1−
Γi(x)] is monotonously decreasing in x if Wi > 3.
Theorem 1. Under the condition Wi > 3, ∀i ∈ N , the Markov
model characterizing a 802.11 WLAN with selfish users admits
a unique stationary-state solution for any data rate profile
(Ri)i∈N .
Proof: We first show that the Markov model has a station-
ary state solution. By injecting pi into qi, we obtain
qi = 1− (1− ei(Ri))
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
(1 − τj).
Recall (2) and denote τ−i , {τj, j ∈ N , j 6= i}, τi can be
regarded as a function of τ−i. To prove the existence of a
stationary state solution in the Markov chain model, it suffices
to show that the mapping from τ−i to τi, described as follows,
has a fixed point:
τi = Ti(τ−i) ,
2
Wi + 1 + qiWi
∑m−1
l=0 (2qi)
l
,
where qi = 1− (1 − ei(Ri))
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i(1− τj).
Noticing that 0 ≤ τj ≤ 1 holds for any j ∈ N and that
0 ≤ ei(Ri) ≤ 1, it holds that
Ti(τ−i) ≤ 2
Wi + 1 + ei(Ri)Wi
m−1∑
l=0
[2ei(Ri)]
l
<
2
Wi + 1
< 1,
Ti(τ−i) ≥ 2
Wi + 1 +Wi
m−1∑
l=0
2l
> 0.
It follows from Brouwer fixed point theorem [20] that there
exists a fixed point to the mapping (Ti)i∈N .
We then proceed to show the uniqueness of the stationary
state solution. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists
two distinct stationary points s1 , (τ1i , p1i , q1i , i ∈ N ) and
s
1 , (τ2i , p
2
i , q
2
i , i ∈ N ), their must exists i such that q1i 6= q2i .
Without loss of generality, assume that q1i < q2i .
Note that (5) holds at both solutions and that (1 − x)[1 −
Γi(x)] is monotonously decreasing in x if Wi > 3, it follows
from the assumption q1i < q2i that
∏
j∈N (1−τ1j ) >
∏
j∈N (1−
τ2j ), which, by applying (5) to other users j, leads to q1j < q2j .
Noticing that τj = Γj(qj) is monotonously decreasing in qj ,
we have τ1j > τ2j for any other user j, which, combined with
the assumption q1i < q2i (thus τ1i > τ2i ), clearly contradicts
4with
∏
j∈N (1 − τ1j ) >
∏
j∈N (1 − τ2j ). We thus complete the
proof of the uniqueness of the stationary state solution of the
Markov model and also the theorem.
IV. ADAPTED TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY
First introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod’s two
tournaments, Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy [21] is regarded as one
of the best strategies in non-cooperative environments and is the
root of an ever growing amount of other successful strategies.
The core idea of TFT is to start with cooperation and continue
to cooperate if the opponents cooperate. The philosophy behind
is that in selfish environment each rational player is expected
to take more aggressive actions if and only if any other player
acts more aggressively.
In our context, we propose the following adapted version of
the TFT strategy at two levels.
At the medium access level, the TFT strategy is adapted to
ensure that all users operate on the same CW values in order
to guarantee the medium access fairness among users. More
specifically, each user i measures the CW values of other users
during a period of time2. If it detects another user j operating
on a smaller CW value (i.e., Wj < Wi), then it reacts by
setting Wi = minj∈N Wj , otherwise it keeps operating on the
previous CW value.
At the rate adaptation level, the TFT strategy is adapted to
ensure the fairness among users in terms of channel occupation
time, i.e., all users occupy the channel for the same amount
of time when transmitting a packet. More specifically, each
user i measures the channel occupation time of other users
during a period of time. If it detects another user j occupying
a longer period of time for transmission (i.e., Tj > Ti), then
it reacts by setting Ti = maxj∈N Tj , otherwise it sticks to
the previous strategy. The rate adaptation level TFT strategy is
essentially motivated by the well-known performance anormaly
in 802.11 WLANs where a selfish user tends to transmit at
lower data rate so as to enjoy better transmission quality while
it penalizes other users since a lower data rate increases its
channel occupation time.
The above adapted TFT strategy has following desirable
properties which makes it especially suited in WLANs:
• The decision is made solely on local measurement.
• It is simple to implement and only the last measurement
needs to be stored.
• It is especially adapted in wireless networks in that the
broadcast nature makes the observation feasible in promis-
cuous mode.
• It ensures the fairness among selfish users.
In practice, taking into account the various factors influenc-
ing the measurement in wireless environment, a more tolerant
version of the TFT strategy called Generous TFT (GTFT) can
be applied by integrating a tolerance marge.
2How to observe average CW values during a period of time in a saturated
WLAN is addressed in [22].
V. JOINT MEDIUM ACCESS AND RATE ADAPTATION GAME
FORMULATION
We focus on the competitive scenario that each user self-
ishly attempts to optimize its performance by jointly selecting
appropriate strategy (CW value and data rate) under the adapted
TFT framework depicted in the previously section. This setting
gives rise to a non-cooperative joint medium access and rate
adaptation game. In this section, we first specify the utility
function of each user and then give the formal definition of the
game.
A. User Utility: Throughput Analysis
We study a natural utility function for selfish users, the
effective throughput, defined as the quantity of bits per unit time
successfully arriving at the destination. In this subsection, we
use the stationary state solution of the developed Markov model
to derive the expected effective throughput of each user i. We
set out by computing the average virtual slot duration, denoted
as Tslot. As defined in [21], a virtual slot may correspond to a
slot where the channel is idle, to a successful transmission, or to
a collision. Specifically, let σ denote the duration of an empty
slot, T is denote the duration of a successful transmission of user
i, and T iu the duration of an unsuccessful transmission of user i
due to either collision or channel error. We can mathematically
develop Tslot as
Tslot =
∏
j∈N
(1−τj)σ+
∑
i∈N
τi
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
(1−τj)(1−ei(Ri))T is+∑
i∈N
τi
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
(1− τj) +
∑
i∈N
τi
1− ∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
(1− τj)
 T iu,
(6)
where the three terms represent, respectively, the following
possible scenarios:
• with probability
∏
j∈N (1−τj), the system experiences an
empty slot;
• with probability τi
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i(1− τj)(1− ei(Ri)), i has a
successful transmission;
• with probability τi
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i(1 − τj), i experiences a
collision, with probability τi
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i(1 − τj)ei(Ri), i
experiences a transmission failure due to channel error.
In the base-line 802.11 MAC protocol without RTS/CTS3,
the TFT framework ensures that the packet duration is identical
among users. Denote T the time for a packet transmission, de-
note ACK, DIFS and SIFS the time to transmit the ACK DIFS
and SIFS frames, respectively. By neglecting the propagation
delay, we can compute T is and T iu as follows
T is = T + SIFS +ACK +DIFS ≃ T,
T iu = T + SIFS ≃ T,
where the approximation is due to that the control frame size
is order of magnitude smaller than that of a data frame.
3Although we focus in this work on the base-line model, our method and
analysis can be applied in the model with RTS/CTS dialogue, which we leave
for future study.
5Let ρi , 1− τi, noting that σ ≪ T , we have
Tslot ≃ (1 −
∏
j∈N
ρj)T.
Note that (1) the probability that user i performs a trans-
mission without collision is (1 − ρi)
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj; (2) the
transmitted packet, whose size is RiT , is corrupted due to
channel error with probability ei(Ri), after some algebraic
operations, the effective throughput can be written as
Si =
(1− ρi)
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj(1− ei(Ri))Ri
1−∏j∈N ρj .
To conclude this subsection, we take an analytical look at the
packet error rate function ei(Ri). Intuitively, under the adapted
TFT framework, each user should strike a balance between
sending more bits in the packet transmission time by choosing
a higher data rate but at the price of increasing the transmission
error and operating at a lower data rate with less transmission
error. Mathematically, such tradeoff at the rate adaptation level
is modeled as follows. Assuming perfect error detection and
no error correction, we can express ei(ri) as ei(Ri) = (1 −
Pe(Ri))
RiT
, where Pe(Ri) is the bit error rate (BER). Pe is a
function of Eb/N0, the bit-energy-to-noise ratio of the received
signal, e.g., Pe = 12e
−Eb/N0 for DPSK. Assuming an additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, the bit-energy-to-noise
ratio of i
(
Eb
N0
)
i
of the received signal is derived from the SNR
(Signal-to-Noise Ratio) as follows:(
Eb
N0
)
i
= SNR
Bt
Ci
=
hiPi
σ2
Bt
Ri
=
hiBt
σ2
Pi
Ci
,
where Bt is the unspread bandwidth of the signal, Pi is the
transmission power of i, hi is the channel gain from i to the
receiver and σ2 is the AWGN power at the receiver.
Generally, define Gi(Ri) , (1 − ei(Ri))Ri, we have the
following features on ei(Ri) and Gi(Ri) with practical setting
on the packet transmission duration T and the minimal and
maximal operational data rate Rmin,i and Rmax,i.
Lemma 1. It holds that:
• ei(0) → 0, ei(∞) → 1; ei(Ri) is monotonously increas-
ing, twice derivable and strictly convex in Rmin,i ≤ Ri ≤
Rmax,i;
• e′i(Ri) > 0 and is monotonously increasing in Ri;
• Gi(0) = 0, Gi(∞) → 0; Gi(Ri) is strictly concave in
Rmin,i ≤ Ri ≤ Rmax,i.
B. Game Formulation
We model the interactions among selfish users as a non-
cooperative joint medium access and rate adaptation game, in
which each user selfishly maximizes its effective throughput by
jointly selecting its CW value and data rate under the adapted
TFT framework. The game is formally defined as follows4.
Definition 1. The non-cooperative joint medium access and
rate adaptation game, denoted as G, is defined as a triple
G , (N , (Wi,Ri)i∈N , (Si)i∈N ), where N is the set of
4Throughout the paper, we use player and user interchangeably to denote a
wireless node in the studied WLAN.
players, (Wi,Ri) is the strategy set of player i, where Wi ,
{0, · · · ,∞} and Ri , [Rmin,i, Rmax,i], the effective through-
put Si is the utility function of player i.
The solution of the game is characterized by a Nash equi-
librium [23] (NE, simply noted as equilibrium in the paper), a
strategy profile from which no player has incentive to deviate
unilaterally. It can be noted that the challenge in solving G is to
solve a two-dimensional and non-decomposable optimization
problem for each player. To overcome this difficulty and to
get more insight on the structure of resulting equilibrium, we
introduce the following two-level hierarchical game model: the
lower-level rate adaptation game under fixed CW setting and
the higher-level medium access game.
Definition 2. Given a fixed CW setting W , (Wi)i∈N at
the medium access level, the non-cooperative rate adaptation
game, denoted as GR(W), is a tuple (N , (Ri)i∈N , (Si)i∈N ),
where N the player set, Ri = [Rmin,i, Rmax,i] is the strategy
set of player i, Si is the utility function of i. Each player i
selects its data rate Rmin,i ≤ Ri ≤ Rmax,i to maximize Si.
Definition 3. The non-cooperative medium access game, de-
noted as GM , is a tuple (N , (Wi)i∈N , (Ŝi)i∈N ), where N the
player set, Wi = {0, · · · ,∞} is the strategy set of player
i, Ŝi is the utility function of i, defined as Ŝi(Wi,W−i) ,
Si(W,R
∗(W)), where R∗(W) denotes the equilibrium of
GR(W) (i.e., the data rate profile at the equilibrium of the rate
adaptation game under W). Each player i selects its strategy
Wi ∈ Wi to maximize its utility function Ŝi.
By decomposing G, we introduce a two-level hierarchical
architecture which will help us analyze the two-dimensional
joint medium access and rate adaptation problem in the non-
cooperative setting, as explored in the next two sections.
VI. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF LOWER-LEVEL RATE
ADAPTATION GAME
In this section, we solve the lower-level non-cooperative rate
adaptation game in which each user adapts its data rate to
maximize its effective throughput under fixed CW setting. We
study the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and explore
some structural properties of the equilibrium. We focus our
attention to scenarios where users play pure strategies (do not
randomized their data rate). We obtain the following results: (1)
a pure NE exists and is unique; (2) we establish the convergence
to the unique NE; (3) we investigate the efficiency of the NE
in terms of Price of Anarchy (PoA) to gain more insights into
the system behaviors.
To make the analysis tractable, we make the following
assumption (or approximation): the number of users is large
enough so that the strategy change of one user has neglectable
influence on the system state. The approximation is accurate in
large systems where the micro-level strategy variation of any
individual player has neglectable influence on the macro-level
system state. From a game theoretic perspective, we consider
a non-atomic game5.
5Please refer to [24] for a detailed presentation on non-atomic games.
6Particularly in this section, the assumption is mathematically
expressed as the following approximation:∏
j∈N
ρj ≃
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
ρj. (7)
Lemma 2 follows immediately from the non-atomic game
assumption. The proof, consists of checking the relevant deriva-
tives and applying Lemma 1 and the equations (1), (2), (3) and
ρi = 1− τi.
Lemma 2. Under non-atomic game assumption, we have
• ρi is monotonously decreasing and convex in Ri;
•
∂τi
∂qi
is negative and monotonously increasing in Ri.
Proof: It follows from the non-atomic game assumption
that pi =
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i(1− τj) is independent to Ri. As ei(Ri) is
monotonously increasing in Ri (Lemma 1), it follows from (1)
that qi is monotonously increasing in Ri. It then follows
from (2) that τi is monotonously increasing in Ri. Hence
ρi = 1− τi is monotonously decreasing in Ri.
A. Best-response Function
At an equilibrium of GR, if there exists, the data rate of each
player i consists of the best response given the strategy setting
of others. Formally, the best-response correspondence of player
i expressed as a function of the strategies of other players R−i,
denoted as Bi(R−i), is defined as follows
Bi(R−i) , max
Rmin,i≤Ri≤Rmax,i
Si(Ri, R−i). (8)
We prove in this subsection that in the rate adaptation game
GR, Bi(R−i) is uniquely determined by R−i.6 Hence Bi(R−i)
can be defined as a function of R−i.
We start by investigating the derivative of the utility function.
It can be noted that Si(Ri, R−i) is continuous and differentiable
in Ri. After some straightforward mathematical development,
we can write ∂Si∂Ri as follows:
∂Si
∂Ri
=
(1− ρi)Gi(Ri)
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
1−∏j∈N ρj
[
G′i(Ri)
Gi(Ri)
−
1−∏j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
(1 − ρi)(1 −
∏
j∈N ρj)
∂ρi
∂Ri
]
. (9)
Let Ai(Ri) denote the term in the parenthesis of (9):
A(Ri) ,
G′i(Ri)
Gi(Ri)
− 1−
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
(1− ρi)(1 −
∏
j∈N ρj)
∂ρi
∂Ri
. (10)
Noticing that ρi = 1− τi and (1), we have:
∂ρi
∂Ri
= −∂τi
∂qi
∂qi
∂Ri
= −∂τi
∂qi
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
ρje
′
i(Ri).
It then follows that
A(Ri) =
G′i(Ri)
Gi(Ri)
+
(
1−∏j∈N ,j 6=i ρj)∏j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
(1 − ρi)(1 −
∏
j∈N ρj)
∂τi
∂qi
e′i(Ri). (11)
Lemma 3. Ai(Ri) is monotonously decreasing in Ri.
6Generally speaking, the best response strategy of a game is not necessarily
a function (one-to-one mapping), i.e., there may exist several global maxima
of the utility function.
Proof: We can develop the second term of Ai(Ri) as:
1−∏j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
(1− ρi)(1−
∏
j∈N ρj)
∂ρi
∂Ri
=
(
1
1− ρi −
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
1− ρi
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
)
·
∂ρi
∂Ri
=
∂ log
(
1∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
− ρi
)
∂ρi
− ∂ log(1− ρi)
∂ρi
 ∂ρi
∂Ri
=
∂ log
1∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
−ρi
1−ρi
∂ρi
∂ρi
∂Ri
.
It can be checked that since
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
ρj ≤ 1, log
1∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
−ρi
1−ρi
is monotonously increasing and convex in 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1. Since
ρi is convex and monotonously decreasing in Ri (Lemma 2),
∂ log
1∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj
−ρi
1−ρi
∂ρi
∂ρi
∂Ri
is thus monotonously increasing in Ri.
On the other hand, it follows from Lemma 1 that G
′
i(Ri)
Gi(Ri)
=
(logGi(Ri))
′ is monotonously decreasing in Ri. Hence Ai(Ri)
is monotonously decreasing in Ri.
Based on Lemma 3, we can drive the maximizer of Si by
distinguishing the following three cases:
1) Ai(Rmin,i) ≤ 0. It follows from (9) that ∂Si∂Ri < 0
for Rmin,i < Ri ≤ Rmax,i. Si(Ri) is monotonously
decreasing in [Rmin,i, Rmax,i] with a unique maximizer
being Rmin,i;
2) Ai(Rmax,i) ≥ 0. It follows from (9) that ∂Si∂Ri > 0
for Rmin,i ≤ Ri < Rmax,i. Si(Ri) is monotonously
increasing in [Rmin,i, Rmax,i] with a unique maximizer
being Rmax,i;
3) Ai(Rmin,i) > 0 and Ai(Rmax,i) < 0. There exists R∗i
such that ∂Si∂Ri > 0 for Rmin,i ≤ Ri ≤ R∗ and ∂Si∂Ri < 0
for R∗i ≤ Ri ≤ Rmax,i. R∗i is thus the unique maximizer
of Si.
The above analysis shows that the best-response in GR is
indeed a function that can be expressed as follows:
Bi(R−i) =

Rmin,i if Ai(Rmin,i) ≤ 0,
A−1i (0) if Ai(Rmin,i) > 0, Ai(Rmax,i) < 0,
Rmax,i if Ai(Rmax,i) ≥ 0.
(12)
Defined B(R) , (Bi(R−i))i∈N , we show in Lemma 4 that
B(R) is non-decreasing in Rj , ∀j ∈ N , j 6= i.
Lemma 4. B(R) is non-decreasing in Rj , ∀j ∈ N , j 6= i.
Proof: Recall the best-response function (12), let R∗i
denote the root of the equation Ai(Ri) = 0 where Ai(Ri) is de-
fined in (10), it suffices to show that if Rmin,i < R∗i < Rmax,i,
then R∗i is increasing in Rj , ∀j ∈ N , j 6= i. We proceed our
proof by contradiction. Assume, by contradiction, that Rai and
Rbi satisfying Ai(Ri) = 0 such that Rai < Rbi and Raj ≥ Rbj ,
∀j ∈ N , j 6= i.
We first show that under the assumption, it holds that ρai <
ρbi . We proceed by distinguishing the following two cases:
• Case 1:
∏
j∈N ρ
a
j ≥
∏
j∈N ρ
b
j . It follows from eq 18 and
the assumption Rai < Rbi that qai < qbi . It then follows
from (2) that τai > τbi . Hence ρai < ρbi .
7• Case 2:
∏
j∈N ρ
a
j <
∏
j∈N ρ
b
j . It follows from eq 18 and
the assumption Raj ≥ Rbj , ∀j ∈ N , j 6= i that qaj > qbj . It
then follows from (2) that τaj < τbj . Hence ρaj > ρbj , ∀j ∈
N , j 6= i. It then follows ∏j∈N ρaj <∏j∈N ρbj that ρai <
ρbi .
We next show that under the assumption, it holds that∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρ
a
j ≥
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρ
b
j . Otherwise, if
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρ
a
j >∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρ
b
j , then recall the assumption on the non-atomic
game (equation (7)), it follows from (5) that
(1− qaj )(1− Γj(qaj ))
1− ej(Raj )
=
∏
l∈N ,l 6=i
ρaj >
(1− qbj)(1− Γj(qbj))
1− ej(Rbj)
=
∏
l∈N ,l 6=i
ρbj , ∀j ∈ N , j 6= i.
Since ej(Rj) is increasing in Rj and we have shown that (1−
qj)(1−Γj(qj)) is decreasing in qj , it holds that qaj < qbj , ∀j ∈
N , j 6= i, leading to ρaj > ρbj , ∀j ∈ N , j 6= i, which contradicts
to the assumption that
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρ
a
j >
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρ
b
j .
Until now we have shown that ρai < ρbi and
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρ
a
j ≥∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρ
b
j . Now recall the atomic assumption, we can derive
from (11) that
Al(Rl) =
g′l(Rl)
gl(Rl)
+
∏
j∈N ,j 6=l ρj
1− ρi
∂τl
∂ql
e′l(Rl).
Noticing the assumption Rai < Rbi , it holds that Ai(Rai , Ra−i) >
Ai(R
b
i , R
b
−i), which contradicts with the fact both Rai and
Rbi satisfy Ai(Ri) = 0. This contradiction shows that the
best-response mapping Bi(R−i) is non-decreasing in Rj , ∀j ∈
N , j 6= i.
B. Equilibrium Analysis: Existence, Uniqueness and Conver-
gence
Armed with the analysis on Bi(R−i), we now show that GR
has a unique equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Given any CW setting W, the non-cooperative
rate adaptation game GR(W) admits at least an equilibrium.
Proof: Recall Lemma 4 and that Bi(R−i) is bounded
such that Rmin,i ≤ Bi(R−i) ≤ Rmax,i, starting by (Ri =
Rmin,i)i∈N , the best response mapping must converge in a
monotonously non-decreasing fashion to a fixed point which is
an equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 3 further establishes the uniqueness of NE.
Theorem 3. Given any CW setting W, the non-cooperative
rate adaptation game GR(W) admits a unique equilibrium.
Proof: We prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume
that two distinct equilibria a and b exist. Without loss of
generality, assume that
∏
j∈N ρ
a
j ≤
∏
j∈N ρ
b
j .
We first show, by contradiction, that ρaj ≤ ρbj , ∀j ∈ N .
Assume that there exists i ∈ N such that ρai > ρbi . We show
that Rai ≤ Rbi . To this end, assume, by contradiction, that
Rai > R
b
i . We have shown in the proofs of the previous two
theorems that Ai(Ri) is monotonously decreasing in Ri and ρi,
monotonously increasing in ρj (j ∈ N , j 6= i). It then follows
from the assumption that
Ai(R
a
i ) < Ai(R
b
i ).
Now recall that Rai and Rbi is the maximizer of Si is the range
[Rmin,i, Rmax,i], noticing the relationship between ∂Si∂Ri , we
have
Rai > R
b
i ⇒ Rai > Rmin,i ⇒ Ai(Rai ) ≥ 0.
We thus have Ai(Rbi ) > 0, hence we must have Rbi = Rmax,i,
which contradicts with the assumption Rai > Rbi since Ria is
upper-bounded by Rmax,i. Hence we have Rai ≤ Rbi . Recall
the assumption that
∏
j∈N ρ
a
j ≤
∏
j∈N ρ
b
j and ρai > ρbi , it
follows from (1), (3), (2) and ρi = 1− τi that ρai < ρbi , which
contradicts the assumption ρai > ρbi . We have thus shown that
ρaj ≤ ρbj , ∀j ∈ N .
It then holds that τaj ≥ τbj , ∀j ∈ N , it then follows from (5)
that ej(Raj ) ≤ ej(Rbj), leading to Raj ≤ Rbj . If Raj = Rbj , ∀j ∈
N , then recall Theorem 1, it holds that the two equilibria a
and b are identical, which contradicts to the assumption that
they are distinct equilibria. Hence there must exist l ∈ N such
that Ral < Rbl . We distinguish the following two cases
• Case 1: Rbl = Rmax,l. It holds that Ai(Rbl ) ≥ 0. If Ral =
Rmin,l, then Al(Ral ) ≤ 0. If Ral > Rmin,l, then Al(Ral ) =
0;
• Case 1: Rbl < Rmax,l. Since Rbl > Ral ≥ Rmin,i, it holds
that Al(Rbl ) = 0. If Ral = Rmin,l, then Al(Ral ) ≤ 0. If
Ral > Rmin,l, then Al(Ral ) = 0.
In both cases, we have Al(Rbl ) ≥ Al(Ral ).
On the other hand, recall the atomic assumption, we can
derive from (11) that
Al(Rl) =
g′l(Rl)
gl(Rl)
+
∏
j∈N ,j 6=l ρj
1− ρi
∂τl
∂ql
e′l(Rl).
For each i ∈ N , we have shown that Rai ≤ Rbi (with Ral < Rbl ),
ρai ≤ ρbi , ∀i ∈ N . Hence
∏
j∈N ,j 6=l ρ
a
j
1−ρa
i
≤
∏
j∈N ,j 6=l ρ
b
j
1−ρb
i
. It also
follows from ρi = 1 − τi and (2) that qai ≤ qbi . Noticing that
e′l(Rl) > 0 and is monotonously increasing in Rl (Lemma 1)
and that τl is concave and monotonously decreasing in ql
meaning that ∂τl∂ql > 0 and is monotonously decreasing in ql, it
holds that∏
j∈N ,j 6=l ρj
1− ρi
∂τl
∂ql
e′l(Rl)
∣∣∣∣a >
∏
j∈N ,j 6=l ρj
1− ρi
∂τl
∂ql
e′l(Rl)
∣∣∣∣b
Moreover, since gl(Rl) is concave in Rl, log gl(Rl) is con-
cave in Rl. Hence g
′
l(Rl)
gl(Rl)
= ∂ log gl(Rl)∂Rl is decreasing in Rl.
Therefore, we have Al(Rbl ) < Al(Ral ), which contradicts with
Al(R
b
l ) ≥ Al(Ral ). This contradiction completes our proof on
the equilibrium uniqueness.
The following theorem follows naturally, establishing the
convergence to the unique equilibrium of GR(W) under any
initial state (Ri(0))i∈N in an asynchronous manner.
Theorem 4. Assume that the players of GR(W) follows the
best response dynamics from some initial rate vector R(0) ,
(Ri(0))i∈N , i.e., from time to time, an asynchronous update
step is taken where some user i ∈ N updates its strategy
from Ri(n) to Ri(n + 1) = Bi(Ri(n)), and the sequence of
players doing the update steps can be arbitrary as long as the
number of steps between consequent updates of every individual
player is bounded. Then, limn→∞R(n) = R∗, where R∗ is
the unique NE of GR(W).
8Proof: First, consider an arbitrary sequence of update steps
commencing from an initial vector R(0) = (Rmin,i, i ∈ N ),
and denote the resulting sequence of rate vectors by Rmin(n).
Obviously, for any player i, the first time it updates its strategy
will be a nondecreasing update. In light of Lemma 4, it
follows by induction that all updates must be nondecreasing,
i.e., Rmin(n) is a nondecreasing sequence. Since Rmin(n) ≤
Rmax is bounded, it must converge to a limit. Due to the
continuity of the best-response function, this limit must be its
(unique) fixed point R∗.
In a similar manner, consider a sequence of best-response
updates from an initial vector of R(0) = (Rmax,i, i ∈ N ).
By the same analysis, Lemma 4 implies that all the updates in
the sequence must be non-increasing, and the sequence must
therefore converge to R∗.
Finally, consider a sequence of best-response updates R(n)
commencing from an arbitrary initial data rate vector R(0).
From Lemma 4, it follows that Rmin(n) ≤ R(n) ≤ Rmax(n),
provided that for every n, the update step is performed by the
same flow in all three sequences. Since, as established above,
Rmin(n) and Rmax(n) converge to R∗, it follows that the
same is true for R(n) as well.
C. Equilibrium Efficiency Analysis
Having derived the unique NE of GR(W), we proceed to
evaluate the efficiency of the unique NE compared with the
global optimal by quantifying the Price of Anarchy (PoA),
[21], defined as the ratio between the optimal global utility
and the system utility achieved at the NE. In other words,
PoA quantifies the efficiency loss due to selfish competition
compared to cooperation. Due to the complexity of the problem
and in order to make our analysis tractable, we focus on
the symmetrical and unconstraint scenario where Gi(Ri) are
identical for all players and Rmin (Rmax, respectively) are
sufficiently small (large) so that the unique equilibrium satisfies
∂Si
∂Ri
= 0. However, as shown in Section VIII by simulation,
we observe the same results for general cases.
We first show in Theorem 5 that in the symmetrical case, the
equilibrium is also symmetrical such that it holds that R∗i =
R∗j , ρ
∗
i = ρ
∗
j , ∀i, j ∈ N .
Theorem 5. In the symmetrical case, the equilibrium is also
symmetrical, i.e., R∗i = R∗j , ρ∗i = ρ∗j , ∀i, j ∈ N .
Proof: We first prove R∗i = R∗j , ∀i, j ∈ N . Otherwise
if there exist i, j such that R∗i 6= R∗j . Since the players
are symmetrical, by swapping R∗i and R∗j we obtain another
equilibrium. This clearly contradicts with Theorem 3 on the
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Noticing that ei are identical among players, it then follows
immediately from 18 that τ∗i = τ∗j , ∀i, j ∈ N , leading to ρ∗i =
ρ∗j , ∀i, j ∈ N .
Armed with Theorem 5, the equilibrium can thus be solved
numerically by imposing Ai(Ri) = 0 and combining the
equations (1), (2) and (3). Specifically we study a practical
setting where users use M -ary QAM modulation of which the
bit error rate is
Pe ≃ 4
(
1− 1√
M
)
Q
(√
3α2 log2(M)
(M − 1)
Eb
N0
)
. (13)
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Fig. 2: Price of Anarchy as a function of N
In Figure 2, we plot the numerical result on the PoA with a
typical WLAN setting M = 64, α = 1, SNR = 15dB. We also
report the similar results with other parameter settings. From
Figure 2 and recall the results on the the performance anormaly
in 802.11 WLANs where a user operating on low data rate can
drastically degrade the overall network performance, we report
the following desirable properties of the adapted TFT strategy
at the rate adaptation level:
• The PoA is close to 1 in the studied cases, signifying
that the adapted TFT strategy can actually lead the selfish
users to a reasonable efficient equilibrium, which is shown
to be unique, despite the user selfishness and the lack of
coordination among users.
• The scalability of the adapted TFT strategy is also demon-
strated in that the PoA decreases with N and tends to
around 1.02.
We conclude this section with a discussion on the distributed
implementation of the best-response strategy to converge to the
unique equilibrium. To compute the best-response strategy, each
user should locally compute (11). To that end, each player
can estimate the SNR by adding a feedback in the ACK
packets indicating the power at the receiver and compare it
with the emission power to further derive ei(Ri) and Gi(Ri).
Besides, each player can calculate
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρj based on local
observation by using the approach proposed in [25], [7] based
on observing the average number of consecutive idle slots
between two transmission attempts. Since each user knows its
own strategy, he can compute Ai(Ri) in (11) locally. Hence,
the NE can be achieved based on solely local observation.
VII. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF HIGHER-LEVEL MEDIUM
ACCESS GAME AND THE GLOBAL GAME
In this section, we investigate the higher-level medium access
game under the adapted TFT framework given that once players
choose their CW strategy, they play the lower-level rate adapta-
tion game by operating on the resulting unique equilibrium of
the game. In the following analysis, we first show the existence
of equilibrium for the medium access game, which is also the
system equilibrium. Since there may exist multiple equilibria,
9we introduce the equilibrium refinement process to find the
most efficient one. We then develop a distributed algorithm to
converge to the refined equilibrium. We also study the efficiency
of this equilibrium.
Before delving into the equilibrium analysis, the following
lemma studies a fundamental property by showing that given
any strategy of other players, any player i is always better off
by decreasing its CW value Wi.
Lemma 5. Under the non-atomic game assumption, given any
strategy of other player, any player i gets higher utility by
decreasing its CW value Wi.
Proof: Given any W−i and any Wi < W ′i , we need
to show that Ŝi(Wi,W−i) > Ŝi(W ′i ,W−i). To this end, let
(qj , τj , Rj)j∈N denote the system state at (Wi,W−i) with
(Rj)j∈N being the equilibrium of the lower-level rate adap-
tation game and let (q′j , τ ′j , R′j)j∈N denote the system state at
(W ′i ,W−i) with (R′j)j∈N being the equilibrium of the lower-
level rate adaptation game, it follows from the assumption of
the non-atomic game that the impact of changing Wi and Ri
on the strategy and state of other players is negligible. Hence
(qj , τj , Rj)j∈N ,j 6=i = (qj , τj , Rj)j∈N ,j 6=i.
Now let i operate on data rate R′i at (Wi,W−i), it fol-
lows from (1) and (3) that qi < q′i, further leading to
τi > τ
′
i . Noticing that τ ′j = τj , ∀j ∈ N , j 6= i, we have
Ŝi(W
′
i ,W−i) < Si(Wi, R
′
i). Recall the definition that given
the CW setting (W ′i ,W−i), Ri is the best response to R−i,
it holds that Ŝi(Wi,W−i) ≤ Si(Wi, R′i). Therefore, we have
Ŝi(Wi,W−i) > Ŝi(W
′
i ,W−i).
Lemma 5, whose proof is detailed in xx, justifies the pro-
posed adapted TFT strategy as it is motivated by that smaller
CW value leads to higher effective throughput.
A. System Equilibrium Analysis
The proposed adapted TFT framework can ensure that all
users operate on the same CW value, i.e., Wj = W, ∀j ∈ N .
For any player i ∈ N , it can be noted that:
• When W = 07, meaning that any player j transmits its
packets without waiting, we have Ŝi(W) = 08;
• When W→∞, noticing (2) that τi ≤ 2W+1 → 0, it holds
that Ŝi(W)→ 0.
Hence there exists 0 < W ∗i < ∞ such that Ŝi(W∗i ) is
maximized.
Definition 4. For any player i ∈ N , let Ŵi denote the set
containing all CW values Wi such that for any W ≤ Wi, it
holds that Ŝi(W) ≤ Ŝi(Wi).
Recall the adapted TFT strategy, Definiton 4 indicates:
• when operating at any Wi ∈ Ŵi, player i has no incentive
to decrease its CW value;
7Throughout this section, to make the analysis concise, we use boldface
letters W to denote a N -element vector with each element being W , i.e.,
W , (Wj = W )j∈N .
8Recall that Ŝi, defined in Definition 3, denotes the utility of i for the
higher-level medium access game.
• when operating at some W ′i /∈ Ŵi, player i can always
find Wi < W ′i such that Ŝi(Wi) > Ŝi(W′i), i.e., i is
always better off by deviating from W ′i to Wi.
Example 1. Let us see an example to clarify the above
definition and notation. Consider a scenario where Ŝi(0) = 0,
Ŝi(1) = 0.1, Ŝi(2) = 0.15, Ŝi(3) = 0.14, Ŝi(4) = 0.16
and Ŝi(W) < Ŝi(4), for any W ≥ 5. In this example,
Ŵi = {0, 1, 2, 4}. When operating on W = 3 and W ≥ 5,
player i can increase its utility by decreasing W to 2 and 4,
respectively (note that under the adapted TFT strategy, other
players will also decrease their CW values correspondingly).
Since Ŝi(0) = 0 and Ŝi(W) ≥ 0 for W ≥ 0, we have 0 ∈
Ŵi and 1 ∈ Ŵi. Recall that W ∗i is the maximizer of Si(W∗i ), it
follows from Definition 4 that W ∗i ∈ Ŵi. Let Ŵ =
⋂
i∈N Ŵi,
Ŵ is not empty by containing at least 0,1. We next show in
Theorem 6 that any strategy profile W with W ∈ Ŵ is an
equilibrium of the higher-level medium access game GM and
that any other strategy profile cannot be an equilibrium.
Theorem 6. Under the adapted TFT framework, any strategy
profile W with W ∈ Ŵ is an equilibrium of GM . Any other
strategy profile cannot be an equilibrium of GM .
Proof: We first show that any player i has no incentive to
deviate from W where W ∈ Ŵ .
First, it follows straightforwardly from Lemma 5 that i has
no incentive to increase Wi from W . We now show that i
has no incentive to decrease Wi from W , either. To this end,
recall the adapted TFT framework, decreasing Wi from W to
W ′ < W leads to other players decrease their CW value to
W ′. The system thus operates on W′. Recall Definition 4,
we have Ŝi(W′) < Ŝi(W). Player i thus has no incentive to
decrease Wi from W , either. It then follows from the definition
of equilibrium that W is an equilibrium of GM .
We then show that any other strategy profile cannot be an
equilibrium of GM . Otherwise, if there exists an equilibrium
W
′ with W ′ /∈ Ŵ , then we must have
Ŝi(W) ≤ Ŝi(W′), ∀W ≤W ′, ∀i ∈ N .
It then holds that W ′ ∈ Ŵ , which leads to contradiction with
W ′ /∈ Ŵ , which concludes our proof.
Example 2. To clarify the analysis of Theorem 6 on the
equilibria of GM . Consider an example of GM with two players
with the following utility setting:
• Ŝ1(0) = 0, Ŝ1(1) = 0.1, Ŝ1(2) = 0.15, Ŝ1(3) = 0.14,
Ŝ1(4) = 0.16 and Ŝ1(W) < Ŝi(4), for any W ≥ 5;
• Ŝ2(0) = 0, Ŝ2(1) = 0.11, Ŝ2(2) = 0.16, Ŝ2(3) = 0.165,
Ŝ2(4) = 0.163, Ŝ2(5) = 0.166 and Ŝ2(W) < Ŝi(5), for
any W ≥ 6;
In this example, it can be checked that W1 = {0, 1, 2, 4} and
W2 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 5}; hence Ŵ = {0, 1, 2}. Theorem 6 shows
that there are 3 equilibria in this example: 0, 1 and 2. It can
be easily verified that no player has incentive to deviate from
these equilibria under the adapted TFT strategy and that any
other strategy profile is not an equilibrium.
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The following theorem on the equilibrium of the global joint
medium access and rate control game holds naturally.
Theorem 7. Under the adapted TFT framework, any strategy
profile (W,R∗(W)) with W ∈ Ŵ and R∗(W) being the
unique equilibrium of GR(W) is an equilibrium of the global
joint medium access and rate control game G. Any other
strategy profile cannot be an equilibrium of G.
Proof: We first show that any player i has no incentive to
deviate from W ∗. Consider that i deviates from (W ∗i , R∗i (W))
to (W ′i , R
′
i) with Wi 6= W ∗i . Recall the non-atomic game
assumption, by operating on R′i and decreasing from W ′i to
W ∗i , τi increases and thus ρi decreases while ρj remains the
same for j 6= i. Hence Si increases by switching from (W ′i , R′i)
to (W ∗i , R
′
i). Therefore, player i has no incentive to increase
Wi. Moreover, player i has no incentive to decrease Wi to
some W ′′i < W
∗ since under the adapted TFT framework, this
will push other players to W ′′i and the system will converge
to (W′′i ,R
∗(W′′i )), where R∗(W′′i ) is the unique equilibrium
of GM (W′′i ). As shown in Theorem 6, the throughput of i
decreases.
Moreover, since R∗(W) is the unique equilibrium of
GR(W), any player i has no incentive to unilaterally change
R∗i , either.
We then show that any other strategy profile cannot be a
system equilibrium. Firstly, under the adapted TFT strategy,
at any equilibrium, the CW values are identical for all players,
otherwise it follows from Lemma 5 that the players with higher
CW values have incentive to decrease their CW values. Second,
the data rate profile must be the unique equilibrium of GR
under the correspondent CW setting. Given the above observa-
tion, it holds that the CW setting of any system equilibrium
must be an equilibrium of GM , otherwise if (W,R∗(W))
with W > W ∗ is a system equilibrium, then for any player
i, by deviating from W to W ∗, the system will be dragged to
(W∗,R∗(W∗)), where it enjoys a higher throughput. It then
follows from Theorem 6 that any strategy profile with W > W ∗
cannot be a system equilibrium.
Since 0,1 ∈ Ŵ , Theorem 7 shows that there always exists at
least two equilibria in GM . Generally speaking, among multiple
equilibria, some are not desirable from the system’s perspective.
This can be illustrated by reexamining Example 2 where among
the three equilibria, 2 is the most efficient one while 0 corre-
sponds to system collapse. To address this challenge, a natural
method is to remove those less efficient equilibria to achieve
a desirable outcome. This is achieved by the equilibrium
refinement, explored by the following subsection to find the
most favorable equilibrium at the system’s perspective and to
approach the refined equilibrium.
B. Equilibrium Refinement
We introduce three criteria in the equilibrium refinement
process: fairness, Pareto optimality and system efficiency.
Fairness: an equilibrium is fair if the system resource is allo-
cated fairly among users. In G, all the equilibria (W,R∗(W))
achieve fairness among players in the sense that the players
converge to the same CW value and they occupy the channel for
the same amont of time at any equilibrium. Such user fairness
is inherently enforced by the proposed adapted TFT framework.
Pareto optimality: an equilibrium is Pareto optimal if we
cannot find another equilibrium where the utility of every
player is higher. Let W ∗ , maxW∈ŴW , it holds that only
(W∗,R∗(W∗)) is guaranteed to be Pareto optimal because
from Definition 4, we have
Si(W,R
∗(W)) ≤ Si(W∗,R∗(W∗)), W < W ∗, ∀i ∈ N . (14)
furthermore, (W∗,R∗(W∗)) is the only Pareto optimum equi-
librium among the equilibria if for at least one play i, the strict
inequality holds in (14).
System efficiency: following the same analysis on Pareto
optimality, we can show that (W∗,R∗(W∗)) achieves the
maximal system throughput among the equilibria. Moreover, if
for at least one play i, the strict inequality holds in (14), then
the system effective throughput at (W∗,R∗(W∗)) is strictly
higher than any other equilibrium.
The equilibrium refinement thus leads to a unique efficient
NE (W∗,R∗(W∗)). Next we study how to approach the
refined equilibrium. We start by establishing the following
lemma that bounds W ∗ and leads to more efficient search.
Lemma 6. Let Gmaxi , maxRi Gi(Ri). Given any strategy
profile W0, denote x∗ the root of the equation (1−x)
n−1x
1−(1−x)n =
Ŝi(W0)
Gmaxi
, it holds that Ŝi(W) ≤ Ŝi(W0) for W ≥ 2x∗ .
Proof: Recall the formula of Si, noticing that
(1− ρi)
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
ρj =
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i
ρj −
∏
j∈N
ρj ≤ 1−
∏
j∈N
ρj ,
it holds that
Ŝi(W) =
(1− ρi)
∏
j∈N ,j 6=i ρjGi(R
∗
i (W))
1−∏j∈N ρj
≤ Gi(R∗i (W)) ≤ Gmaxi , ∀ W ≥ 0.
On the other hand, it can be checked that T (x) , (1−x)
n−1x
1−(1−x)n
is monotonously decreasing in x and T (0) = 1, T (∞) = 0.
T (x) = Ŝi(W0)Gmax
i
admits a unique solution x∗.
When all players operate on W , it holds that ρj = 1− τj ≥
2
W , ∀j ∈ N . Therefore, W ≥ 2x∗ , it holds that
Ŝi(W0) ≥ Gmaxi T
(
2
W
)
≥ T (x∗) ≥ Ŝi(W),
which completes our proof.
Lemma 6 implies that operating on CW larger than 2x∗ cannot
be a system equilibrium. Consequently, when searching the
efficient equilibrium W∗ derived from the refinement process,
if the CW value of players is currently W , it suffices to search
until mini∈N Wi where Wi = 2x∗
i
with x∗i being the root
of (1−x)
n−1x
1−(1−x)n =
Ŝi(W )
Gmax
i
. Based on this result, we develop a
distributed algorithm (Algorithm 1) to cooperatively search and
converge to W∗.
The core idea of the first loop in the algorithm is to have
a coordinator to synchronize the CW values of players. The
coordinator can be any player. Then each player i can construct
Ŵi based on Definition 4. The construction process terminates
at mini∈N Wmaxi since from Lemma 6, it suffices to parse CW
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values until mini∈N Wmaxi , which is dynamically updated in
the algorithm. In the second loop of the algorithm, by applying
the adapted TFT strategy, the system converges gradually to
the efficient equilibrium W ∗.
As can be noted from Algorithm 1, it can be implemented
in a distributed fashion and any player can be the coordinator
to synchronize the CW values. Moreover, all players have
incentive to participate the cooperative search of the efficient
equilibrium. This can be shown as follows: it follows from
the adapted TFT strategy that the system will operate on the
same CW value for all players; hence the system will operate
on an equilibrium, otherwise we can find a player who can
increase its utility by decreasing its CW value; thus the CW
value is monotonously decreasing and will reach an equilibrium
because the smallest CW value 0 is an equilibrium; since W∗
is the most efficient equilibrium among the potentially multiple
system equilibria, any selfish but rational player has incentive
to operate on W ∗ by participating the cooperative search.
A note on the robustness of the algorithm. We observe
via numerical experiments (detailed in Section VIII) that by
deviating from W ∗ (e.g., due to variation in measurement or
a large step size instead of 1) and by varying the number of
players, the user can still achieve reasonably efficient point,
with at least 80% of the throughput achieved at the efficient
equilibrium. This observation demonstrates the robustness of
the algorithm in dynamic scenarios with frequent arrival and
departure. Such robust feature can significantly facilitate the
practical implementation of the algorithm.
C. Efficiency of System Equilibrium
In this subsection, we investigate the efficiency of the system
equilibrium (W∗,R∗(W∗)) derived previously. To make our
analysis tractable, we focus here on the symmetrical scenario
where the channel conditions are the same for all players.
Nevertheless, we observe similar results for generic scenarios,
as detailed in the simulation results in Section VIII.
In the symmetrical scenario, it follows from the analysis
of the previous two subsections that W ∗ = W ∗i , ∀i ∈ N .
This means that the refined equilibrium W∗ is composed of
the maximizers of all the individual utility function Ŝi. Let
(Wopt,Ropt) denote the system optimum, since W∗ is the
refined equilibrium of GM , we have
Ŝi(W
∗,R∗(W∗)) ≥ Ŝi(Wopt,R∗(Wopt)).
Noticing the symmetry of players, we have∑
i∈N Si(W
opt,Ropt)∑
i∈N Ŝi(W
∗,R∗(W∗))
=
Si(W
opt,Ropt)
Ŝi(W∗,R∗(W∗))
≤ Si(W
opt,Ropt)
Ŝi(Wopt,R∗(Wopt))
,
which is the PoA of GR(Wopt). This result readily indicates
that the system level PoA equals to the PoA of the lower-level
rate adaptation game at Wopt. Since we have demonstrated
that the PoA of the lower-level rate adaptation game is very
close to 1, we hence have that the refined equilibrium of the
global game is also very close to system optimum from a social
perspective.
Algorithm 1 Searching the efficient equilibrium W∗: executed
at each player i
1: Initialization: Set Wi = 0, Ŵi = {0}, Smaxi = 0,
Wmaxi =∞ and set ǫ to a small value
2: Start: Any player l broadcasts a message StartSearch
to start the searching process
3: loop
4: if a message SearchStop received then
5: Quit the loop by going to line 25
6: end if
7: if a message StartSearch or IncreaseW received
or a message StartSearch or IncreaseW sent in
case i = l then
8: Increase Wi by 1 and wait a short period of time for
others to increase their CW values
9: Count the number of acknowledged packets ns dur-
ing a period tm and measure the average effective
throughput Si(Wi) = nsRiTtm
10: if Si > Smaxi then
11: Set Smaxi = Si, W ∗i = Wi, Wmaxi = 2x∗ where x
∗
is the root of the equation (1−x)
n−1x
1−(1−x)n =
Si
Gmax
i
12: Add Wi into Ŵi
13: end if
14: if Wi ≥Wmaxi then
15: Set Wi = W ∗i
16: Send a message SearchStop containing W ∗i
17: Quit the loop by going to line 25
18: else
19: if i = l then
20: Wait sufficient long time for the other players to
finish the above operations
21: Send a message IncreaseW
22: end if
23: Go to loop
24: end if
25: end if
26: end loop
27: repeat
28: Measure CW values of others during a period of time
29: if minjWj < Wi − ǫ then
30: Set Wi to the largest element in Ŵi that is smaller
than Wi
31: end if
32: until minjWj ≥Wi − ǫ
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VIII. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present a suite of numerical experiments to
evaluate the proposed adapted TFT strategy by demonstrating
and validating some of the theoretical results of the joint
medium access and rate adaptation game studied in the paper,
especially for the cases that we are not able to investigate
analytically. Specifically, we focus on several scenarios indica-
tive of the typical interactions among the players in the game,
starting with the symmetrical case with homogeneous players,
continuing with a more sophisticated scenario with two classes
of homogenous players, and finally considering the generic
asymmetrical scenario with heterogeneous players randomly
parameterized. In particular, we investigate the structure of
equilibrium of these scenarios and compare it to the system
optimum.
A. Symmetrical Scenario
We start by analyzing the symmetrical scenario with homo-
geneous players. To this end, we simulate a standard 802.11
WLAN of N homogeneous users operating on 64 QAM with
α = 1, SNR = 15dB (please refer to (13)). We set a large
rate range with Rmin,i = 1Mbps and Rmax,i = 100Mbps.
Table I and Figure 3 compare the efficient system equilibrium
found by applying Algorithm 1 to the global optimum. By
comparing the players’ equilibrium strategy and the optimal
strategy, we observe that players are slightly more aggressive
by using smaller CW value and lower data rate leading to less
transmission error. However, as suggested by the simulation
results, the efficiency loss of the system due to players’
selfishness is very small, which demonstrates that the proposed
adapted TFT framework can bring about a reasonably efficient
equilibrium with only a small system utility loss. This result
is especially meaningful given the result on the performance
anormaly of multi-rate 802.11 WLAN where users tend to
operate on low data rate [12].
Figure 4 further studies the robustness of Algorithm 1
searching the efficient system equilibrium. To this end, we focus
on the case N = 12 where the efficient system equilibrium is
W ∗ = 220 and we study the case where the system does not
operate exactly on the equilibrium: (1) the system operates on
the CW around W ∗ varying from 100 to 500, this may be
due to the choice of a large step size in the algorithm; (2)
there are users departing and /or entering without rerunning
the algorithm, this is to simulate the case where the algorithm
is not run too frequently, we thus study the system efficiency
by varying the number of players. We report from the result of
Figure 4 that even in the case where the system cannot operate
on the exact equilibrium, the system can still achieve at least
85% the optimal utility, which demonstrates the robustness of
Algorithm 1. This robust and tolerant feature can significantly
facilitate the implementation of the algorithm.
B. Scenario with two Classes of Players
We proceed to study a more sophisticated scenario composed
of two classes, namely L and H, of homogeneous players whose
N 2 7 12 17 22 27
WNE 45 110 220 345 510 710
W opt 55 140 265 430 655 905
TABLE I: System equilibrium vs. global optimum
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SNR are SNRL = 10 and SNRH = 20, respectively. The
other parameters are set to the same values as before. The
results, shown in Figure 5 and Table II, demonstrate again that
although slightly more aggressive due to individual selfishness,
the efficient system equilibrium is very close to the system
optimum from a social perspective.
N 4 8 12 16 20 24
WNE 70 130 190 335 550 810
W opt 80 160 285 470 665 900
TABLE II: System equilibrium vs. global optimum
C. Asymmetrical Scenario
We finally consider various heterogeneous scenarios with
asymmetrical players. More specifically, we simulate a WLAN
of N players, each with a SNR randomly chosen from [5, 25].
For each N , we run 100 simulations with random SNR and plot
the average Price of Anarchy in Figure 6. In the simulation,
we make the following observations: (1) the convergence to a
system equilibrium is always achieved at the rate adaptation
level under a given CW value, which confirms our theoretical
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Fig. 4: Throughput around equilibrium: robustness analysis of
Algorithm 1
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results; (2) the PoA remains small, with the average value
bounded by 1.12 and not exceeding 1.25 in any simulated case,
which demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed adapted TFT
strategy in generic scenarios; (3) the PoA is decreasing in the
number of players which shows the good scalability of the
proposed mechanism.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the joint rate adapta-
tion and medium control in WLANs from a non-cooperative
game theoretic perspective. We have developed an adapted
TFT strategy to orient the network to an efficient equilibrium
where users can jointly configure their CW size and data rate
selfishly. We have formulated the interactions among selfish
users under the adapted TFT framework as a non-cooperative
joint medium access and rate adaptation game. By analyzing
the structural properties of the game, we have provided insights
on the interaction between rate adaptation and 802.11 medium
access in competitive setting. We have shown that the game
has multiple equilibria, which, after the equilibrium refinement
process that we develop, reduce to a unique efficient one.
We have developed a distributed algorithm to achieve this
equilibrium and demonstrated that the equilibrium achieves the
performance very close to the system optimum from a social
perspective.
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